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A REQUIEM FOR SAM'S BANK
RONALD J. MANN*
INTRODUCTION
Wal-Mart's application to form a bank ignited controversy among dis-
parate groups, ranging from union backers to realtors' groups to charitable
organizations.' The dominant voices, though, were those of independent
bankers complaining that the big-box retailer would drive them out of busi-
ness. Wal-Mart denied any interest in competing with local banks by open-
ing branches, 2 claiming that it was interested only in payments processing.
Distrusting Wal-Mart, the independent bankers urged the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to deny Wal-Mart's request and lobbied
state and federal lawmakers to block Wal-Mart's plans through legislation.
Ultimately, Wal-Mart withdrew its application, concluding that it stood
little chance of overcoming the opposition.
The controversy dovetails with a banking regulatory concern about the
existing system for supervising commercial firms that own non-traditional
banks. Wal-Mart sought to form an industrial loan company (ILC) under
Utah law, 3 which it could do only if the FDIC approved its application for
* Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I am grateful for input from presentations at the law
schools at the University of Michigan and Columbia, at the Payment Cards Center at the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Philadelphia, and at the Conference on Rethinking Payment Law at the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York.
1. The FDIC received thousands of comments in response to Wal-Mart's application for deposit
insurance and held the first formal public hearings ever on such an application. Wal-Mart's application,
as well as the public comments, written statements, and hearing transcripts, were initially available on
the FDIC's website, and can still be found on the Internet Archive. Internet Archive of Wal-Mart Bank
Federal Deposit Insurance Application, http://web.archive.org/web/20070223065142/http://www.fdic.
gov/regulations/laws/walmart/index.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2008).
2. A number of states nevertheless reacted by introducing bills to ban out-of-state industrial
banks from opening bank branches in their states, several of which appear to undermine the power of
Federal banking agencies to authorize new bank branches for any kind of out-of-state bank under the
Riegle Neal Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 36(g), 1828(d)(4) (2000). See Letter from Julie Williams, Chief Counsel,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, et al., to John "Buz" Gorman, General Counsel, Conference
of State Bank Supervisors 3 (July 28, 2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
legalint/bhecchangeincontrol/2006/20060728.pdf.
3. UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-8-3 (West 2004). Industrial loan companies were created a century ago
to make loans to workers but they have evolved in recent years as they gained limited powers to accept
deposits and make loans.
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deposit insurance. 4 Under what many regard as a loophole in the existing
statutory framework, 5 Wal-Mart's regulator would have been the FDIC,
and Wal-Mart's primary responsibility to this entity would have been to
refrain from plundering its assets. 6 By contrast, entities that own traditional
banks ("bank holding companies" or "financial holding companies") are
subject to oversight by the Federal Reserve and to various "prompt correc-
tive action" rules that obligate the parent in times of distress to provide aid
to the banking subsidiary. In some cases, the Federal Reserve can force
divestiture. 7
Despite Wal-Mart's ability to provide more than adequate capital for
an ILC, 8 the FDIC responded first by freezing all deposit insurance applica-
tions submitted from proposed ILCs first for six months (through January
2007), and then by freezing applications filed by non-financial entities for
another year (through January 2008). The FDIC explained that it needed
more time to examine the impact of ILCs on the banking system.9 Federal
regulators are concerned about the ILC structure because the number and
size of the entities using the ILC loophole has mushroomed in the last few
4, Without regard to any intent to accept deposits, Wal-Mart would need deposit insurance to
satisfy both its stated business objectives and the requirements of Utah law. Wal-Mart did plan to offer
certificates of deposit to charitable organizations and individual investors generated through deposit
brokers, but not demand deposits. See WAL-MART BANK, INDUSTRIAL BANK APPLICATION PACKAGE
pt. 1, § l(a)(4) (2005) [hereinafter APPLICATION], available at http://web.archive.org/web/20070214042
701/www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/walmart/application.html (select "Wal-Mart Application-Part I"
hyperlink).
5. The loophole appears in section 101 of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987
(CEBA), which defined "bank" for purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act to exclude qualifying
ILCs, credit card banks (as defined in CEBA), and certain then-existing "nonbank" banks. Because this
entity would not be a "bank" for purposes of that statute, Wal-Mart could own it without being a bank
holding company. Among other things, the exemption requires the ILC to obtain deposit insurance from
the FDIC. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(H). The statute also requires that the entity satisfy one of the three
following conditions: that it have not changed control since 1987, that it have less than $100 million in
assets, or that it not accept demand deposits. Utah law uses the term "industrial bank" to refer to the
Utah entity that qualifies for the federal ILC exception in section 1841(c)(2)(H). UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-
8-3. To make matters confusing, Utah also recognizes a separate type of entity called an "industrial loan
company" (under section 7-8-21), which does not qualify for the federal ILC exception. UTAH CODE
ANN. § 7-8-21. Rather, that entity avoids bank status entirely under 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1)(B) because
it is not qualified to accept deposits. For simplicity, the text uses the common term "ILC" to refer to the
Utah industrial bank.
6. Federal Reserve Act §§ 23A, 23B, 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1.
7. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843, 1844, 1831o (notice obligations, reporting obligations, and capital
requirements, respectively); 12 C.F.R. §§ 325.101-325.105 (2007) (prompt corrective action rules).
8. For analysis of what the "non-financial" limitation means in this context, see Fed. Reserve
Sys., Order Determining That Certain Activities Are Complementary to the Financial Activity of Un-
derwriting and Selling Health Insurance (Sept. 7, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/other/other20070907al .pdf.
9. See Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Places Six-Month Moratorium on Industrial
Loan Company Applications and Notices (July 28, 2006); Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC
Extends Moratorium on Industrial Loan Company (ILC) Applications by Commercial Companies for
One Year; Will Move Forward on Applications from Financial Companies (Jan. 31, 2007).
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years.O Absent some action, the owners of an increasingly significant share
of institutions will become largely unsupervised.
At the same time, financial holding companies and thrift holding com-
panies (entities like CitiGroup and Merrill Lynch, which own both deposit
institutions and other financial services companies) believe that Wal-Mart's
ability to avoid intrusive oversight and supervision would give it an unfair
competitive advantage. Wal-Mart's response is that the loophole has been
around for decades, and that there is no difference between Wal-Mart using
this loophole and companies like GM, BMW, and General Electric that do
the same. I I Most pointedly, why should Target, a prominent competitor,
have access to this loophole while Wal-Mart does not? 12 Given the large
share of Target's corporate profits derived from its ILC and its credit card
bank, 13 Wal-Mart's question is a fair one. 14
This article situates those debates in the context of payments policy.
Stepping away from banking policy per se, Wal-Mart's plans should be
viewed in the historical context of the overlapping shifts in payment sys-
tems that are happening in this country: from older payment systems (cash
and checks) that are public, paper-based, and universal, to newer systems
(predominantly credit and debit cards) that are private, electronic, and net-
10. The assets of ILCs have grown from $4 billion in 1987 to $140 billion as of 2005. U.S. GOv'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-62 1, INDUSTRIAL LOAN CORPORATIONS: RECENT ASSET GROWTH
AND COMMERCIAL INTEREST HIGHLIGHT DIFFERENCES IN REGULATORY AUTHORITY 5 (2005).
11. The prominent ILCs of non-financial entities have remarkably different missions. BMW uses
an ILC to issue a consumer credit card. Target and Volvo use ILCs to issue payment and credit cards
for businesses. General Motors uses its industrial bank to provide car financing. GE's ILC is a diversi-
fied multinational financing entity. Most interesting of all, Volkswagen's industrial bank specializes in
home equity lending.
12. Target uses its Utah ILC to issue its business credit card. It also has a CEBA credit card bank
(under 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(F)) for its consumer credit card operations.
13. Nearly 19% of Target's 2005 earnings ($452 million out of $2.4 billion) came from its credit
card operations. Target Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 16, 2007).
14. 1 note for the sake of completeness three similar organizational forms that would not suit Wal-
Mart's purposes: a nonbank bank, a CEBA credit-card bank, and a Utah ILC under section 7-8-21 of the
Utah Code. Wal-Mart cannot form a nonbank bank because the loophole for those entities was closed in
1987-entities holding those banks are exempt from bank holding company (BHC) status only if they
controlled the bank before 1987 and if the entity refrains both from making commercial loans and
accepting demand deposits. The Federal Reserve previously had tried to treat the parents of those
entities as BHCs under Regulation Y, but the Supreme Court overturned the applicable regulation in
Board of Governors v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986). A CEBA credit card bank
(authorized by 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(F)) might be useful for credit card operations, but would not be
useful if Wal-Mart wished to engage in other activities such as electronic check processing. Finally, the
Utah industrial loan company under section 7-8-21 of the Utah Code would solve Wal-Mart's BHC
problem (because the entity would not be a bank under the BHCA), but without deposit insurance it
could not get an account at the Federal Reserve. 12 U.S.C. §§ 342, 461(b)(1)(A). A bank without an
account at the Federal Reserve could not send or receive ACH transactions directly, a significant part of
Wal-Mart's plan.
2008]
CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW
worked. 15 Thus, in 2003, for the first time, the value of retail purchases
made with credit and debit cards exceeded the value of retail purchases
made with checks. 16
At the turn of this century, a new era of payments is beginning. De-
spite the obvious benefits payment cards have brought to our economy, 17
the maturation and market dominance 18 of the private networked electronic
systems operated by Visa and MasterCard have had two adverse effects.
First, a diminished incentive to innovate has led to stagnation in the devel-
opment of less expensive payment systems. Second, the network effects
that pose a barrier to entry have allowed Visa and MasterCard to deploy
strategies designed to suit the interests of the banks that control them, to the
detriment of the merchants and cardholders that use and accept the cards.
The last decade has seen increased recognition by merchants of the impor-
tant link between payment systems and the profitability of their operations.
Wal-Mart's application is but one of the steps merchants and others are
taking to undercut the effective control of the payments systems that the
large payment card networks have established in the last half century. Seen
from that perspective, a powerful case can be made that granting Wal-
Mart's application would have had a salutary effect on a market that has
seen too little competition and innovation for the last two decades.
Part I begins by discussing the payments markets in which Sam's
Bank would have participated and the likely consequence of permitting its
entry into those markets. Part II analyzes the regulatory interests affected
by the creation of Sam's Bank. Part III discusses broader policy concerns
that weigh even more directly in favor of facilitating greater entry to the
payments industries. Finally, Part IV proposes a new regulatory framework
for "payment services providers," designed to facilitate the entry of parties
like Wal-Mart that would bring new strength to the payments industries
15. For a detailed discussion of those shifts, see RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE
GROWTH AND REGULATION OF PAYMENT CARD MARKETS 9-19 (2006) [hereinafter CHARGING
AHEAD].
16. Compare Market Shares of Consumer Payment Systems Origination in the U.S., THE NILSON
REPORT: ISSUE 761, Apr. 2002, at 8, with U.S. Payment Systems-The 12 Mediums of Exchange of
Monetary Value, THE NILSON REPORT: ISSUE 823, Dec. 2004, at 6-7.
17. See CHARGING AHEAD, supra note 15, at 37-44 (discussing cost savings from the use of cards
for payment and lending transactions).
18. Although the market in which the literally thousands of potential credit card issuers compete
against themselves is highly competitive, competition at the network level (with and between Visa and
MasterCard) is considerably less robust. As discussed below, there are several other electronic pay-
ments networks, the PIN-based debit networks, the ACH network, and the developing Check 21 proc-
essing networks. In general, however, those networks are competing to draw volume from paper-based
systems rather than competing against the credit card networks.
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without engaging in activities that implicate the traditional concerns associ-
ated with regulation of depository institutions.
I. WAL-MART AND PAYMENTS POLICY
The existing debate has not seriously analyzed how Wal-Mart's stated
business objectives might affect the policy decision whether to permit Wal-
Mart to go forward. However much Wal-Mart might be able to operate a
profitable set of retail banks from its immense network of retail locations,19
the reason Wal-Mart wanted a bank at this time was to lower the costs it
incurs in collecting payments from its customers. A bank would have given
Wal-Mart direct access not only to the systems for processing credit cards
and debit cards, but also to the increasingly important electronic systems
for check processing, i.e., the automated clearinghouse (ACH) networks.
A. Wal-Mart and Cost-Cutting
Wal-Mart's desire to cut payment costs should not be surprising. Wal-
Mart is famous for pressing suppliers to lower their costs-steadily, sub-
stantially, and repeatedly. But the costs of payment services for Wal-
Mart-the costs it pays to process checks and the fees it pays when it ac-
cepts credit cards or debit cards-have not gone down substantially in
years. On the contrary, the price of those products-which are at their core
sophisticated information processing services-has remained stable as the
costs of information processing have fallen. There was a time when Visa
and MasterCard were leaders in the deployment of cutting-edge informa-
tion technology, 20 but as their dominance in the marketplace has grown, the
incentives to increase the efficiency of their technology have become less
pressing.
To be sure, Wal-Mart has benefited in labor-cost savings and in speed
of checkout as customers have shifted from slower paper-based checking
19. The skepticism about Wal-Mart's proposal comes in part from Wal-Mart's previous attempts
to acquire banks and in part from its current forays into retail banking in places like Mexico and Can-
ada. See Steve Goldstein, Wal-Mart Gets Approval to Offer Banking in Mexico, MARKETWATCH, Nov.
24, 2006, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/wal-mart-gets-approval-offer-banking/story.asp;
Hollie Shaw & Carrie Tait, Wal-Mart Eyes Banking, NAT'L POST, Oct. 31, 2006, at Al, available at
http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=a4le~cda-dd28-46df-996d-56dd29le9e63. It also is
relevant that Wal-Mart's present plans would not bind the resulting ILC. Under applicable FDIC regula-
tions, Wal-Mart after only a few years would have been able to broaden the scope of its operations
considerably, though it would have needed the consent of the FDIC for major changes. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 333.2 (2007).
20. See DEE HOCK, BIRTH OF THE CHAORDIC AGE 195-213 (1999); DEE HOCK, ONE FROM
MANY: VISA AND THE RISE OF CHAORDIC ORGANIZATION 163-79 (2005).
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systems to faster card-based payment systems. 21 And the rise of electronic
check conversion lowers Wal-Mart's payment acceptance costs considera-
bly, at least for the check writers that patronize its stores. 22 But the charges
for the increasingly mainstream credit card products offered by Visa and
MasterCard remain stagnant. Thus, by comparison to the costs of the other
products their customers might use to make payments, the charges that
Wal-Mart pays when it accepts Visa and MasterCard products seem in-
creasingly out of line.23
Wal-Mart's dissatisfaction with the credit card, in particular, is exac-
erbated by competition with discount and dollar stores that often do not
accept credit cards at all. The costs of credit card acceptance are less prob-
lematic for high-end retailers, which operate on high margins and depend
on the discretionary and impulsive spending that credit cards facilitate. 24
Wal-Mart's traditional emphasis on low prices,25 by contrast, leaves it with
low margins against which a fixed payment cost that does not decline over
time has become increasingly conspicuous.
B. Cutting the Costs of Payments
The tension between the relatively stable costs of credit card accep-
tance and Wal-Mart's cost-cutting philosophy has long motivated Wal-
Mart to explore possible responses that would lower its costs. For example,
Wal-Mart was one of the lead plaintiffs in the successful "honor all cards"
21. See Elizabeth Klee, Paper or Plastic? The Effect of Time on Check and Debit Card Use at
Grocery Stores 25 (Nov. 16, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=687159 (empirical analysis indicating that check transactions typically
take about 40 seconds longer than payment card transactions).
22. Electronic check conversion converts a paper check at the point of sale to an ACH transaction
cleared through the NACHA network (a POP entry in NACHA's terminology). Wal-Mart has been
among the market leaders in retail adoption of that technology. Stuck in a Rut, POP E-Checks Get a
Boost from Bentonville, DIGITALTRANSACTIONS, Sept. 13, 2006, http://www.digitaltransactions.net/
newsstory.cfm?newsid = 1089.
23. Although it is difficult to generalize because precise figures are proprietary, a merchant like
Wal-Mart on a $100 transaction probably pays about $1.80 if it accepts a credit card, $1.00 if it accepts
a Visa or MasterCard debit card, eighty cents if it accepts a check, fifty cents if it accepts a PIN-based
debit card, and twenty-five cents if it performs an electronic check conversion. Honor-all-cards policies
have made it difficult for merchants to limit the types of networked payment products that they accept,
while surcharge restrictions have made it difficult for merchants to affect consumer choice between and
among networked and universal payments. The result from the merchant's perspective is that consum-
ers driven by advertising and rewards programs choose payment products unaffected by the high mar-
ginal cost that the merchant pays to accept those products.
24. See CHARGING AHEAD, supra note 15, at 45-59 (showing that consumers spend more when
they use payment cards than when they use paper-based payment products).
25. See Susan Strasser, Woolworth to Wal-Mart: Mass Merchandising and the Changing Culture
of Consumption, in WAL-MART: THE FACE OF TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALISM 52-56 (Nelson
Lichtenstein ed., 2006).
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litigation against Visa and MasterCard and has been a leader in facilitating
non-card payment systems at its Web site. Thus, properly viewed, the ap-
plication to form Sam's Bank is the latest in a continuing series of pay-
ments policy initiatives. To understand this particular initiative, it is useful
to explore exactly how it would lower payment costs.
C. Credit Cards
The conventional explanation assumes that Wal-Mart would form an
industrial loan company that would operate as an acquirer much like the
ILC subsidiary of First Data Corporation (the largest acquirer in the coun-
try, with more than a 50% share of a market).26 But this would not lower
Wal-Mart's net payment costs in any substantial amount. Let us suppose
that Wal-Mart is currently paying its acquirer (Chase Paymentech, a joint
venture including Chase and First Data) about 1.65% in merchant fees on
its Visa and MasterCard transactions (an excellent rate for a merchant that
is not a grocery store). 27 If we substitute Sam's Bank as the acquirer, Wal-
Mart would pay that 1.65% to its subsidiary instead of to Chase Paymen-
tech.
The problem, however, is that Sam's Bank would have to forward
something in the range of 1.43% of those funds to Visa and MasterCard
(the interchange share) and would have to fund its payment processing
operations out of the remaining 0.22% of revenues. Because the business of
acquiring credit card transactions is competitive, the spread that acquirers
retain has been dropping substantially in recent years. As information tech-
26. Visa and MasterCard require all entities that participate directly in their networks (either by
issuing cards or acquiring transactions) to be banks. Because ILCs qualify as banks without subjecting
their parents to federal BHC regulation, nonbank processing companies like First Data have used ILCs
to conduct their acquisition businesses. First Data recently converted its Colorado ILC to a non-
industrial trust, to accommodate its pending takeover by KKR. See First Data Gets OK to Convert
Industrial Bank, DENY. Bus. J., July 19, 2007, available at http://www.bizjoumals.com/denver/stories
/2007/07/16/daily39.html?fromrss=l. Originally, all acquirers were banks, but in recent years, the
market has become dominated by technology companies that specialize in efficient processing. First
Data Corporation now processes about half of all general-purpose credit card transactions in the United
States. See Top U.S. Acquirers, THE NILSON REPORT: ISSUE 854, Apr. 2006, at 1, 7. Although the
market is increasingly concentrated, the market for acquisition is competitive, in the sense that a large
number of acquirers compete for merchants based on the price that they charge. As of 2006, ninety
acquirers processed more than $1 million transactions per week.
27. The lowest credit card interchange rate for a non-supermarket merchant is 1.43% under the
current rates for either Visa or MasterCard. VISA U.S.A., INTERCHANGE REIMBURSEMENT FEES (2007),
http://usa.visa.com/download/business/accepting-visa/ops.risk-management/Interchange-Rate-Sheets.
pdf, MASTERCARD WORLDWIDE, U.S. AND INTERREGIONAL INTERCHANGE RATES (2006),
http://www.mastercard.com/us/wce/PDF/14992_MasterCard_lnterchange_Rates.andCriteria_-_Octob
er_.2006.pdf. If Wal-Mart pays 1.65% of the sales price to its acquirer and its acquirer (currently Chase
Paymentech) pays 1.43% of the sales price to the issuers, the acquirer receives only 0.22% of the reve-
nues to fund the costs of processing Wal-Mart's transactions.
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nology advances, it becomes cheaper to process payments, particularly for
the largest companies (First Data, Bank of America, and Nova). There is
little reason to think that Sam's Bank could process its payments at a cost
that would leave it with any substantial profit-indeed, there is good reason
to think that Sam's Bank would lose money if it undertook to process pay-
ments at the same price as Chase Paymentech. Even with Wal-Mart as a
client, Sam's Bank would be a much smaller and less experienced acquirer
than First Data.28
If that were the whole story, then Wal-Mart might in fact lose money
if it inserted its subsidiary as the acquirer. That possibility suggests that
Wal-Mart's plan is more complex. Perhaps it also includes issuing Visa or
MasterCard credit cards to its customers, something Wal-Mart cannot do
directly unless it owns a bank. Target, of course, has done this with great
success, with its earnings in recent years from its credit card unit growing
much more rapidly than earnings from retail sales. 29 And this is an option
on which Wal-Mart would save even if it were not as skillful as Target at
lending to its customers. The key point would be that Sam's Bank as issuer
would receive the interchange revenues, the roughly 1.4% of all sales that
the acquirer currently forwards through the Visa and MasterCard system.
Of course, Wal-Mart could try to accomplish the same thing by offer-
ing its own store-branded card without opening a bank. But it has done that
already, most recently with a Discover product issued by GE Consumer
Finance. Historically, however, as Target's experience shows, it is much
easier for a retailer to get a card to the "top of the wallet" if it is a Visa or
MasterCard product than if it is a store-branded card. If Wal-Mart's cus-
tomers (like Target's before them) used the store-branded card rarely, then
that strategy would not lower Wal-Mart's payment costs substantially.
Thus, Wal-Mart's plan likely includes not only acquiring card transactions
from its stores, but also becoming a Visa or MasterCard issuer.
28. If anything, the pending acquisition of First Data by KKR suggests the possibility of an inflow
of capital likely to increase the aggressiveness of First Data's operations. See Joe Bel Bruno, KKR
Continues Talks for First Data Loans, BOSTON.COM BUSINESS, Sept. 10, 2007, http://www.boston.com/
business/articles/2007/09/10/kkr continues talks for first datajloans/ (discussing difficulties KKR
faced in obtaining financing for its acquisition of First Data).
29. Target's credit card earnings grew from $255 million in 2004 (13% of total earnings) to $452
million in 2005 (nearly 19% of total earnings) to $693 million in 2006 (25% of total earnings), while its
non-credit card earnings saw significantly slower growth, rising from $1.63 billion in 2004 to $2.094
billion in 2006. See Target Corp., Annual Report, supra note 13.
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D. Check Conversion
As the discussion above suggests, Wal-Mart also is interested in the
costs it incurs when it accepts payments from customers that do not use
credit cards. 30 For example, given the demographics of Wal-Mart's cus-
tomers, Wal-Mart presumably is one of the largest recipients of checks
among American merchants, and thus has the greatest incentive to lower
the costs of check processing. 31 If Wal-Mart in its capacity as merchant can
save money by converting those paper checks to electronic checks at the
point of sale, it is natural to wonder if Wal-Mart could not save even more
money by eliminating the middleman and participating directly in the proc-
essing of check conversion transactions. Those transactions already are
much cheaper for the retailer than checks or conventional credit and debit
card products. Moreover, continuing developments of technology and in-
frastructure are making the product even better suited for large retailers like
Wal-Mart with many checkout lanes at a single location. 32 Still, they have
been slow to gain a major place in the consumer payments market. Yet
Wal-Mart is ideally suited to deploy them, with a large customer base un-
usually likely to contain check writers. Thus, Wal-Mart well might believe
that it eventually could present and settle those items more cheaply than
existing financial institutions. 33
E. Debit Cards
Similar reasoning applies to PIN-based debit card transactions, which
traditionally have been processed over regional networks like NYCE and
Pulse, rather than the international networks like Visa and MasterCard.
Again, because that market has faced less competition than the market for
acquiring Visa and MasterCard transactions, it is easier to see how Wal-
30. Although the share of customers that pay with checks has fallen from 27% to 16% in the last
four years alone, Wal-Mart will still receive more than one billion checks in 2007. The cost savings to
Wal-Mart of converting those checks to electronic transactions is significant. Wal-Mart Goes Chain-
wide With POP in Bid To Cut Payment Costs, DIGITALTRANSACTIONS.NET, Apr. 17, 2007,
http://www.digitaltransactions.net/newsstory.cfm?newsid=l 313.
3 1. Check use is increasingly concentrated among adult Americans without credit cards. Adult
Americans without credit cards are for the most part lower in income and wealth than those with credit
cards, and because Wal-Mart is a dominant retailer for that sector of our society, Wal-Mart presumably
has a higher share of customers that do not have credit cards than many other retailers.
32. See Nadia Oehlsen, Check Conversion Moves to the Back Office, CARDS & PAYMENTS, Dec.
2006, at 44; Christopher Westfall, The U.S. Payments System: Needing Consolidation, or Fine As Is?,
KPMG BANKING INSIDER, Dec. 22, 2006, http://www.kpmginsiders.com/displayanalysis.asp?csid =
176855.
33. If Wal-Mart has any interest in that product, it could not form a CEBA credit card bank under
the § 1841(c)(2)(F) exception, because it would go beyond the "credit card operations" to which those
entities are limited. 12 U.S.C. § 184 1(c)(2)(F) (2000).
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Mart could profit by cutting out a "middleman" bank from those transac-
tions. Wal-Mart has taken indirect steps to cut out that middleman by its
participation in Tempo Payments (previously Debitman). 34 But Tempo
Payments has been slow to penetrate the market. 35 As with any new pay-
ment system, it is not enough that one party (the merchant in this case)
prefers the system; there has to be some effective motivation to cause the
consumer to use the system as well. The difficulties Tempo Payments has
faced are the most conspicuous evidence of the continuing power of the
network effects associated with the maturation of the Visa and MasterCard
systems. In the end, it should be no surprise that Wal-Mart's application
emphasizes its intention to deploy its own debit cards. 36
F. Internet Payments
Wal-Mart's concerns have particular significance on the Internet,
where Visa and MasterCard traditionally have held an even more dominant
position than at retail. Credit cards dominated Internet retail when that
market first arose in the late 1990s largely because traditional competitors
(checks and cash) were wholly impractical for remote electronic pur-
chases. 37 But the failure of Visa and MasterCard to give adequate attention
to problems of fraud and data security has given merchants a powerful
incentive to search for new payment alternatives. And in the Internet envi-
ronment, where all interactions are electronic, products like Bill Me Later
and Google Checkout (both discussed in more detail below) have spread
much more rapidly than products like Tempo Payments have spread in the
conventional retail environment.
Wal-Mart.com is a major force in Internet retail, with more than a bil-
lion dollars in annual sales, one of the very largest operations outside the
34. Tempo Payments is a debit card network in which customers obtain cards from retailers rather
than from their banks. The cards fund purchases through the ACH network, which is much less expen-
sive than the conventional debit card processing systems. NACHA presumably cooperates with Tempo
Payments because the success of Tempo Payments would shift transaction volume to the ACH network
from the traditional check-processing and PIN-based debit-card networks. A Tempo Payments transac-
tion costs a participating retailer about fifteen cents, much less than the fifty cents that is the typical cost
of a conventional PIN-based debit card transaction. The transaction is even cheaper if the customer uses
a Tempo Payments card issued by the retailer, because the retailer receives a rebate of about half of the
fifteen-cent fee. See Tempo Payments, Inc., Overview, http://www.tempopay.com (last visited Mar. 3,
2008); Debitman Rebuilds and Targets Card Association, CARDS INT'L, at 1 (Dec. 6, 2006) [hereinafter
Debitman Rebuilds].
35. See Debitman Rebuilds, supra note 34 (stating Debitman is accepted at little more than
200,000 retailers).
36. See APPLICATION, supra note 4, at 1.
37. See RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 260-70
(3d ed. 2005) [hereinafter PAYMENT SYSTEMS].
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office supply and electronics sectors. 38 As discussed above, Wal-Mart al-
ready has been a leader in supporting the use of electronic check conver-
sion at the retail counter. If Wal-Mart had a bank (and thus had direct
access to the networks over which those payments are processed), there is
every reason to think that it could accelerate the design and deployment of
non-card payment products on the Internet, breaking down the dominant
market power that Visa and MasterCard have in that sector.
II. BANK REGULATION
Although the preceding discussion suggests that consumers might
benefit if Wal-Mart had a bank, it provides no justification for exempting
Wal-Mart and its bank from appropriate banking regulations. On that point,
the United States has abandoned since the Great Depression the notion that
the market can be trusted to monitor the safety and soundness of banks. 39
The problem is not simply that banks are large enterprises with substantial
assets. American car manufacturers, airlines, and steel companies all at one
time were large enterprises with assets far exceeding those of most banks. 40
Yet those entities were never subject to the kind of pervasive ongoing bu-
reaucratic supervision to which banks and their owners are regularly sub-
jected (and from which Wal-Mart is now and would continue to be
exempt). Some in recent years have argued that banks should be treated
like other large companies-with considerably less supervision and regula-
tion.4 1 But the idea that banks need no constraints will get little policy trac-
tion as long as the crises of the 1980s can be recalled. In this context, two
particular concerns are important: the separation of commerce and banking,
and the systemic harms from bank failure. Neither concern would apply to
an ILC limited to the provision of payment services.
A. Separating Commerce from Banking
Among other things, the systemic bank failures during the Depression
produced an abiding sense that banks should be separate from large com-
38. INTERNET RETAILER, 2006 Top 500 RETAIL WEB SITES, at 57 (2006).
39. See JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL., BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 80-92 (3d ed. 2001).
40. That is particularly true in the United States, where populist concerns have kept most banks
relatively small. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 54-59 (1994).
41. Peter Wallison, Why Do We Regulate Banks? FIN. SERV. OUTLOOK (Am. Enterprise Inst. For




mercial enterprises. 42 The importance of this concern in modem banking
regulation is difficult to gauge. For one thing, it is not clear that this con-
cern has ever been entirely sincere. It always has had the effect of insulat-
ing financial institutions from competition by potentially more nimble non-
financial firms. And given the relatively small size of American banks, it
often (as in the case of Wal-Mart) excludes owners of undoubted liquidity
and soundness. 43 It also is relevant that most of our important trading part-
ners (Japan and Germany being the most conspicuous examples) have ro-
bust banking systems without any such separation.44 The weakening of
legal constraints on non-financial companies that came with Gramm-
Leach-Bliley surely reflects growing skepticism about the importance of
this problem.45 Yet, federal law still imposes considerable restraints on
financial holding companies, restraints that Wal-Mart wishes to avoid.
Whatever their general weight, concerns about the confluence of
commerce and banking are ill-placed here. The principal argument against
confluence points to the likely concentration of financial assets and the
corresponding potential for inequity in the lending markets.46 The idea is
that the commerce/banking conglomerate will have an advantage over the
purely commercial enterprise because it will provide financing to its related
commercial enterprises that will not be available to unrelated third-party
competitors. As the Senate Banking Committee said in a report on the sub-
ject, "[t]he separation of banking from commerce helps ensure that banks
allocate credit impartially, and without conflicts of interest. The nonbank
bank loophole .... raises the risk that banks' credit decisions will be based
not on economic merit but on the business strategies of their corporate par-
ents."'47 More generally, the distinction between commerce and banking
increasingly seems incoherent as applied to payments providers, which
increasingly are IT firms. The increasing importance of IT as the core com-
petency of these firms raises the natural question why First Data should be
treated differently from Microsoft or Google, or even from Wal-Mart.
42. See MACEY ET AL., supra note 39, at 22-24. The concern is not nearly as strong in Canada,
where a system of larger banks survived the Depression unscathed. See generally DUNCAN
McDOWALL, QUICK TO THE FRONTIER: CANADA'S ROYAL BANK (1993).
43. See Lawrence J. White, Should Wal-Mart, Real Estate Brokers, and Banks Be in Bed To-
gether? A Principles-Based Approach to the Issues of the Separation of Banking and Commerce (NYU
Stem Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. EC-07-21, 2007), available at http://w4.stem.nyu.edu/ empli-
brary/7-21 .pdf.
44. For a detailed discussion, see Bernard Shull, The Separation of Banking and Commerce in the
United States: An Examination of Principal Issues 24-33 (OCC Econ. Working Paper, Paper No. 99-1,
1999), available at http://v-ww.occ.treas.gov/ftp/workpapcr/wp99-I .pdf.
45. See MACEY ET AL., supra note 39, at 464-67.
46. See id. at 460-63.
47. S. REP. No. 100-19, at 8(1987).
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In sum, that rationale offers little reason to oppose Sam's Bank, at
least in the form in which it was proposed, because Sam's Bank would not
have been a commercial lender. Rather, it would have been a payments
processor. A payments processing enterprise need not involve the aggrega-
tion of assets and lending power that poses a risk to the efficient allocation
of investment capital.
B. Systemic Effects of Bank Failure
The most obvious justification for the distinction between banks and
other large enterprises is that the failure of a bank that accepts deposits is
more likely to have a cascading effect than the failure of any other corpo-
rate enterprise, even a large one. When a large corporate enterprise fails,
the resulting financial distress is borne primarily (though not entirely) by
that institution's shareholders and its contract partners (creditors, suppliers,
employees, and the like). In the case of a depository institution, however,
there is a greater risk that the failure of the institution will have ripple ef-
fects extending throughout the economy to the creditors of creditors. This
is particularly true when the bank that fails holds large deposits from other
banks. So, regulators traditionally have regarded large banks as "too big to
fail," because of the likelihood that their failure would bring down other
banks, causing distress to the depositors of those banks and more broadly
through the economy. 48
More recently, as the sophistication with which examiners study bank
operations has increased, regulators have given growing attention to the
likelihood that a bank's financial arrangements are so intertwined with
those of other entities as to create a substantial risk of this kind of cascad-
ing failure. Thus, we can see now, even relatively small institutions could
create serious problems if they are involved in activities that affect other
banks. In this literature, the risks rest not only on the size of deposits, but
also on large-scale payments processing.49
At first glance, the focus of Sam's Bank seems to play directly into
this justification. 50 But that view fails to account for the nature of the pay-
48. See generally GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK
BAILOUTS (2004).
49. See generally JAMES R. BARTH, GERARD CAPRIO, JR. & ROSS LEVINE, RETHINKING BANK
REGULATION: TILL ANGELS GOVERN (2006).
50. Thus, a bipartisan group of congressmen, in a March 10, 2006 letter to the FDIC, assert that
given the retailer's "massive scope and international dealings," its entry into the banking industry would
carry too many risks. For example, "a financial crisis within the company... could damage the bank
and severely disrupt the flow of payments throughout the financial system." Letter from Stephanie
Tubbs Jones, Congresswoman, I Ith Dist. of Ohio, et al. to Martin Gruenberg, Vice Chairman, FDIC
(Mar. 10, 2006), available at http://www.house.gov/list/press/ohl ltubbsjones/pr0603I0b.html.
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ments that Sam's Bank would handle and how those differ from the large-
dollar wholesale payments that create systemic payment risks. In general,
serious risks from payments processing are associated with the "real-time
gross value" settlement systems that are customary for wholesale payment
operations-in which each entity gives and receives full credit for a trans-
fer at the moment that it is made. 51 In the United States, for example, the
Fedwire system transfers about $1.5 trillion each day, and provides real-
time value at the moment a transfer is made for each of those payments. In
that type of system, the possibility that a bank might be unable to settle its
position at the end of a business day raises a risk for each institution to
which the failed bank sent payments during the course of the day. In the
Fedwire system, the Federal Reserve banks mitigate that risk by guarantee-
ing Fedwire payments through the course of each day.52
The payment operations of Sam's Bank would present less risk. For
one thing, the individual daily obligations would be much smaller. The
Fedwire system commonly permits major banks to make payments during
the course of a single day that substantially exceed the capital of the institu-
tion. The sums at stake in the consumer realm are not nearly so large. Even
for the largest participants in the credit card system, the daily sums are
much smaller than the institution's capital base. JPMorgan Chase cardhold-
ers, for example, spend about $1 billion per day, but the institution's net
worth is in the range of $140 billion.53 JPMorgan's solvency is unlikely to
be substantially affected by daily fluctuations in the inflow and outflow of
payments that typically amount to a tiny fraction of a percent of its market
capitalization.
Moreover, the settlement systems for the small consumer payments
are designed to avoid the liquidity risks associated with wholesale funds
transfers. For example, payments made through the Visa and MasterCard
system are made through multilateral netting at the end of each day. Visa
and MasterCard use Fedwire to apply a single daily credit (or debit) to the
Federal Reserve account of each of their members that reflects the net in-
flow or outflow of that member's daily cards transactions. Similarly, the
electronic check payments that Sam's Bank might clear through its Web
51. It was the exposure of wire-transfer participants at the time of the 1974 failure of Germany's
Herstatt bank that first made the systemic payments risk a common topic of policy concern. See
PAYMENT SYSTEMS, supra note 37, at 239-40; see also Commission Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council on Payment Services in the Internal Market, at 6, COM (2005)
603 final (Dec. 12, 2005).
52. See PAYIMENT SYSTEMS, supra note 37, at 21 !-5.
53. See Purchase Volume at Merchants on U.S. General Purpose Credit & Debit Cards-2005,
THE NILSON REPORT: ISSUE 859, June 2006, at 8, 9; JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-
K), at 22 (Mar. 9, 2006).
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site would be processed in batches through the ACH network on a daily
basis, with net settlements that pose little if any systemic risk.54
If it seems technical to suggest that the details of the process of set-
tling payments can have such an important effect on the systemic risk those
payments raise, consider the following hypothetical. On a given day, Bank
of America acquires $100 million of credit card transactions on cards is-
sued half each by CitiBank and Chase, Citibank acquires $80 million of
transactions on cards issued half each by Bank of America and Chase, and
Chase acquires $60 million of transactions on cards issued half each by
Bank of America and CitiBank. In a gross settlement system, each of those
banks would pay to the others the entire sums that they owed. Bank of
America would send out $70 million ($40 to Citi and $30 to Chase). Citi
would send out $80 million ($50 to BoA and $30 to Chase). And Chase
would send out $90 million ($50 to BoA and $40 to Citi). In a system of
multilateral netting, the payments are much smaller. Bank of America re-
ceives $30 million, Citi would make no payment at all, and Chase would
send out $30 million.
Because the total payments are so much larger in a gross system ($240
million, as opposed to $30 in multilateral netting), it is crucial that con-
sumer payments processing involves multilateral netting rather than gross
settlements. Thus, even if an entity like Sam's Bank were to fail, it is
unlikely that the amounts that it would owe to any particular institution
would undermine the solvency of that institution. Looking back to the regu-
latory justifications discussed above, this suggests a relatively limited sys-
temic need for supervision of the operations of Sam's Bank.
III. THOUGHTS ON A BETTER WAY
As discussed above, the primary consideration should be the possibil-
ity that Wal-Mart's entry to the payments markets would drive product
innovation and cost-cutting that would benefit consumers either directly or
through diminution of the dominant market positions that Visa and
MasterCard currently hold. We seem to stand at a decisive point in the
history of the payments industry. Long dominated by cash and checks,
payment systems that were directly or indirectly supervised by the govern-
ment, the last thirty years have brought increasing dominance to the private
and largely unregulated payments networks built by Visa and MasterCard.
Those networks have contributed great value to the economy by driving
54. See BENJAMIN GEVA, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFERS § 5.01 (2007) (discussing
the ACH settlement process).
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down the costs of payments and lending,55 but the fact remains that they
are operated for the private benefit of the banks that own them. At the same
time, Visa and MasterCard have retained for decades a dominant market
position, repelling repeated challenges from entities like American Express,
Discover, JCB, Diner's Club, and Carte Blanche. It is easy to understand
the reasons for that dominance: network effects make it extremely difficult
for new entrants to gain a foothold in the provision of payment systems. 56
Because those effects underscore the strength of the networks' market
dominance, the shift from public systems to a pair of persistently dominant
private systems is at least potentially troubling. 57
Of course, one possibility is that the antitrust system will break down
the dominant positions of Visa and MasterCard-either through private
litigation or through actions brought by federal regulators. But given the
difficulties and complexities of an antitrust response, surely it is worth
considering a more market-oriented approach: fostering entry by competi-
tors. Entry by Wal-Mart well might present the incumbents with a more
serious challenge than they have faced in decades. Wal-Mart has a network
of almost 4000 locations in the United States, with tens of millions of de-
voted customers. If Wal-Mart is as capable here as it has been in other as-
pects of its business, pressure from Wal-Mart could drive considerable
improvement-some combination of new products or better prices.
The entry of Wal-Mart would be salutary not solely because of the
possibility that competitive pressure will reduce costs and drive innovation
in product design. By broadening the groups involved in the design and
deployment of products, it would broaden the range of pricing strategies.
To explain, the existing networks of Visa and MasterCard increasingly
depend on a strategy under which merchants will pay an interchange fee
that provides sufficient revenue to issuers to fund programs that foster
higher spending and borrowing by cardholders.58 That strategy has been
effective because network effects pose a barrier to new entrants that might
use different strategies, and because even with a high interchange fee, the
payment card system is in many contexts more attractive to merchants than
the paper-based systems it is replacing.
55. See CHARGING AHEAD, supra note 15, at 37-44.
56. See id. at 75-85 (attributing the unique dominance of credit cards in United States markets to
their earlier deployment here).
57. For discussion of the effects of the competitive power of the major networks, see id. at 121-
27.
58. See id. at 154-66; Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the "'Sweat Box" of Credit Card
Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 384 (2007).
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But systems designed by merchants or other industry players would
doubtless use a fundamentally different pricing strategy. The most obvious
approach is a system like Tempo Payments, which can provide payment
services more cheaply because it avoids the costs of subsidizing the busi-
ness-development programs issuers fund with interchange revenues. Simi-
larly, Bill Me Later is rapidly gaining attention, especially among airlines,
but also at mainstream sites like Walmart.com. Bill Me Later undercuts
standard credit card interchange rates by avoiding the speedy approval and
settlement process of the credit card networks. 59 The neutral pricing strat-
egy of products like Tempo Payments and Bill Me Later makes sense for
merchants that do not depend on the discretionary spending that the aggres-
sive rewards and teaser-rate strategies of Visa and MasterCard motivate.
More intriguing are the recent developments that presage a world of
below-marginal-cost pricing of payments services, as payments themselves
are used to subsidize other business activities. The leader here is Google
Checkout, which can undercut standard credit card interchange fees be-
cause it uses the payments business as a way to attract advertisers. 60
The pricing strategies that Wal-Mart has used for its other financial
products strongly suggest that Sam's Bank could subsidize payments costs
in a similar way. The financial services that Wal-Mart already offers are
priced very competitively. For example, in the forty-five states in which it
cashes checks, Wal-Mart charges a flat $3 fee, compared to charges from
$6 to $15 for other check cashers. Apparently Wal-Mart's prices for money
orders and wire transfers are very low as well. 61 As discussed above, own-
ing a bank would allow Wal-Mart to broaden its product lines, bringing
lower prices to more niches of the consumer financial services market. In
an era when we are concerned about the ability of traditional financial insti-
tutions to design products that can be priced attractively for lower-income
individuals, the entry of Wal-Mart bodes well.
59. See Peter Burrows, Big Plastic's Online Challenger, BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 30, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/dec2005/tc2005l230-391101 .htm?campaign-id=top
Stories-ssi_5; Jennifer LeClaire, Online Merchants Choosing Alternative Payment Options, E-
COMMERCE TIMES, Dec. 21, 2005, http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/47623.html.
60. See Miguel Helft, Google Steps More Boldly into PayPal's Territory, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20,
2006, at Cl, C14. PayPal pioneered a simpler strategy. It offers payment services to merchants at a
blended price that undercuts the credit card networks because some PayPal purchasers fund their pur-
chases through cheaper ACH transactions. Visa and MasterCard initially contested PayPal's right to
process transactions for third-party sellers, but ultimately backed off because PayPal's use of the card
networks increased overall transaction volumes. See also Ronald J. Mann, Regulating Internet Payment
Intermediaries, 82 TEX. L. REV. 681 (2004). Even now, it is not clear that PayPal ever will be a threat to
Visa and MasterCard's market position on the Intemet.
61. Wal-Mart and Financial Services: Supercentre Banking, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 2005, at 65




This is not to say that there are no concerns about what Wal-Mart
might do with its bank. Let us suppose (as seems likely) that Wal-Mart
prices check cashing so low because the people for whom it cashes checks
will spend their money in Wal-Mart's adjacent stores, and that it will use
the same strategy with new products and services it can deploy through
Sam's Bank. Should that cross-subsidization of consumptive activity trou-
ble us? My inclination is to view that problem as minor. It may be that
Wal-Mart can use this tactic to boost sales in its stores, and it may be that
these kinds of bundling techniques can be used to entice consumers into
dubious consumption decisions. But given the product lines and brands
available at Wal-Mart's typical stores-not exactly focused on indulgence
and luxury-this problem does not seem serious.
Another area of concern relates to the credit card product in particular.
If Wal-Mart plans to issue a general-purpose credit card, should we be
concerned because of the historical example of Target, where the profits
from the credit card soon may dwarf the profits that flow directly from
retail operations? 62 As I demonstrate elsewhere, there are significant rela-
tions between credit card spending, overall debt, and bankruptcy, so a strat-
egy designed to increase the effectiveness of card marketing to Wal-Mart
customers would raise a serious concern. 63 Again, the countervailing factor
is the likelihood that Wal-Mart would not focus on the profitability of
credit card issuance per se, but instead on lowering the costs of retail pay-
ments as a way to foster profits from retail sales. Indeed, the longstanding
hostility of Wal-Mart to Visa and MasterCard suggests that it is much more
likely that Wal-Mart will focus on making payment products cheaper
(something at which it excels) and much less likely that it will focus on
maximizing interest and fee-based revenue streams (something repugnant
to its competitive culture, at which it has little or no experience).
IV. A NEW APPROACH
The preceding discussion underscores both a mismatch between the
existing regulatory framework and the risks that Sam's Bank actually
would pose and an increasingly arbitrary distinction between financial and
non-financial owners of payment service providers. This suggests value in
a new approach that would address payment processing risk in a uniform
and coherent way. The European Commission's proposed Payment Ser-
vices Directive provides a useful model. Indeed, because the market posi-
62. See Target Corp., Annual Report, supra note 13.
63. See CHARGING AHEAD, supra note 15, at 60-72.
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tion of the credit card networks is much stronger here than it is in the EU,
there is an even greater reason to design a regulatory framework that would
encourage competition. 64
The first step is to identify the best regulator and the appropriate popu-
lation of regulated entities. Because the concern is the risk of payment
processing, all entities that have access to the clearing and settlement sys-
tems should be included, and the status of their owners as financial entities
should be irrelevant. The Federal Reserve Board's position at the center of
the major clearing and settlement systems makes it the obvious choice as
regulator.
The second step is to decide what type of monitoring and supervision
is required. Because these institutions would neither take deposits nor en-
gage in commercial or consumer lending,65 the level of supervision should
be considerably less than for traditional depository institutions. The princi-
pal regulatory activity should be to ensure the maintenance of a level of
liquidity commensurate with the types of payment operations in which the
entities engage. The emphasis should be on liquidity rather than capital,
because the concern is whether the entity will be able to settle its transac-
tions on a daily basis, not whether it has the long-term financial strength
measured by capital accounts.
Entities, like Sam's Bank, that limit themselves to net-settlement con-
sumer systems would require relatively low levels of liquidity. Entities that
seek access to riskier real-time gross settlement systems would be held to
higher levels. As compared to current regulatory frameworks, this has the
advantage that the Federal Reserve would be charged with directly moni-
toring and assessing the appropriate levels of liquidity for those entities
most likely to disrupt the steady flow of payments on which our economy
increasingly depends. Indeed, given the importance of this activity, it is
startling that the Federal Reserve's current mandate on these questions is so
indirect.
My proposal does not directly address the propriety of retaining the
rules that exempt ILCs from the supervision required of other entities that
control financial institutions. Level-playing-field concerns, however, do
64. The sanguine competitive position in the EU might change if the implementation of SEPA (the
Single Euro Payments Area) leads to continent-wide dominance for Visa and MasterCard. See, e.g., EU
Warns Cards Market over SEPA, CARDS INT'L, Nov. 22, 2006, at 1; ECB Concerned About SEPA
Duopoly, CARDS INT'L, Dec. 6, 2006, at 17.
65. The purpose of this framework is to permit access to payment systems for entities that have no
need to engage in banking. To the extent the owners of these entities are involved in other finance-
related businesses like credit card lending or other types of consumer finance, those activities would
remain subject to appropriate scrutiny under other frameworks.
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suggest that the other entities that currently use the ILC framework for
payments operations should be forced into the payment service provider
category. The existing regulatory framework involves a serious mismatch
between the activities of those entities (pervasive involvement in payments)
and the regulatory purposes (attending to deposit protection for entities that
receive few deposits). Resolution of that mismatch is at the heart of my
proposal, even without expressing any opinion on the care with which the
FDIC currently supervises those entities.
CONCLUSION
The focus of this Symposium is on the proper level of uniformity in
the legal rules that govern payment systems. My submission identifies a
threshold problem, the lack of competition and barriers to entry in the mar-
kets for payment services providers. My thesis is that a revision of the
regulatory framework designed to foster competition and lower barriers to
entry is a valuable part of an effort to design coherent rules. Greater com-
petition should foster innovation in payment systems development, with
more rapid convergence on the systems that respond most effectively to the
needs of commerce. At the same time, we might have more confidence that
rules developed in competitive markets provide satisfactory answers to
problems with unauthorized transactions, error, and the like.
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